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531 
OUR PERFECT, PERFECT CONSTITUTION 
Michael Stokes Paulsen* 
I suffer from a peculiar and aggressive strain of Stockholm 
syndrome, the psychological tendency of kidnapping victims to 
identify with, and even come to adore, their captors. The strain 
with which I am afflicted is unique to teachers of constitutional 
law. I am now in my twentieth year as a law professor. 
(Unbelievable, I know. Yes, indeed, I started very, very young—
evidently sometime in my early teens.) Before that, I was a 
student and practitioner (of sorts) of constitutional law. I have 
been a hostage to constitutional law for a long time. 
Constant exposure results in a certain degree of 
contamination. Eventually, it produces utter transformation. 
And so it is that I must now announce that I have, finally, 
succumbed. I now believe that everything in the U.S. Constitution 
is perfect. More than that, I have come around to the 
understanding that every Supreme Court interpretation of the 
Constitution is perfect as well and indeed must be regarded as 
part of the Constitution. I hereby repudiate everything I have 
ever said or written to the contrary (which is to say, essentially 
my entire academic career to date). 
Alas, this leaves me in something of a quandary. What could 
I possibly contribute to a Constitutional Commentary symposium 
asking participants how they would re-write the Constitution? 
There is no room for improvement! All that remains is for our 
perfect written Constitution to be updated to reflect, perfectly, 
the Supreme Court’s perfect interpretations of it. Thus, my 
relatively minor contribution to this symposium is a series of 
“amendments”—if one could really call them that—to bring the 
text more fully into harmony with the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements. These pseudo-amendments might usefully be 
 
 * Distinguished University Chair & Professor of Law, The University of St. 
Thomas. Editor Emeritus, Constitutional Commentary (1995-2007). Thanks to Rick 
Garnett, Jill Hasday, Robert Delahunty, and Dale Carpenter for comments, suggestions, 
and expressions of outrage; and apologies to Henry P. Monaghan, for riffing on his title, 
Our Perfect Constitution, 56 NYU L. Rev. 353 (1981). 
!!!PAULSEN-273-OURPERFECTCONSTITUTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  2:31 PM 
532 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:531 
 
added as a “pocket part” to pocket copies of the Constitution, so 
that folks (like me) who carry around a copy of the Constitution 
with them in their jacket pocket have a short-and-sweet text that 
includes not only what the Constitution says but also what it 
really means. 
I’ve tried to keep the “amended” text brief and to-the-point. 
For verification purposes and ease of reference, I’ve included 
here a few footnotes identifying the authoritative Supreme 
Court decisions that establish the propositions set forth in these 
conforming amendments. For purposes of the pocket 
Constitution editors, it should be noted that the footnotes 
probably need not be included in the actual copies of the 
Constitution. I include them here just to show that they are, 
indeed, part of our incomparably perfect, perfect Constitution. 
 
CONFORMING AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 
1. Article I, Section 1, Clause 1 is amended to delete the 
words “herein granted.” It shall hereafter read: “All legislative 
Powers shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.”1 
2. Article I, Section 8 is amended to add the following 
sentence, after the listing of enumerated powers: “The 
enumeration in this article of certain legislative powers shall not 
be construed to deny or disparage the power of Congress to 
exercise all legislative powers and enact any laws it likes; provided 
however, that such legislative power is subject to such restrictions 
and rights as the Supreme Court sees fit to prescribe by decision.”2 
 
 1. U.S. Reports passim. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(holding that Congress may regulate wholly intrastate production and consumption of 
wheat for personal use); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may 
regulate wholly intrastate production and consumption of weed for personal use). The 
Supreme Court has held that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to 
regulate wholly intrastate noncommercial activity that does not substantially affect 
interstate commerce (or does not require proof that something—anything at all—
involved in the activity has moved in interstate commerce). United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995); see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). But that “limitation” 
is so easily satisfied by the barest efforts of even the stupidest Congress that we might 
just as well dispense with it, don’t you think? 
 2. Cf. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). See generally sources cited in 
previous note. This conforming amendment is largely redundant of the content of 
supplemental interpretive amendment 1, but is added for purposes of clarity, in order to 
avoid any unsound inference of limitation on congressional power as a result of the 
enumeration in Article I of specific legislative powers. 
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3. The Tenth Article of Amendment to this Constitution is 
repealed.3 
4. Congress may delegate the power to make laws to such 
persons or entities as it sees fit, including (but not limited to) 
agencies or officers it creates from time to time, international 
organizations, and foreign nations.4 
5. The first sentence of Article II, Section 1 is amended to 
read: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America and in such other offices and officers as 
Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish. Such other 
executive officers shall be appointed in a manner prescribed by 
Congress, removable in a manner prescribed by Congress, and 
subject to direction and control either of Congress or of such 
persons or officers as Congress shall determine, including other 
such executive officers created by Congress. The title and 
designation “President of the United States” shall not be 
construed to imply an unrestricted power of presidential direction, 
control, supervision, discipline, or removal of such other executive 
officers as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish, 
except to the extent that Congress may so require or provide.”5 
6. Article II, Section 2, in the clause preceding the first semi-
colon, is amended to read as follows: “The President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, 
 
 3. This is implicit in the preceding amendments, but the point is usefully clarified. 
 4. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (ruling that Congress may 
delegate the power to make laws to an “independent agency” not part of the executive 
branch). Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (upholding limited power of 
“international law norms” to generate U.S. legal obligations and rights); The Paquette 
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law” and includes 
“the customs and usages of civilized nations,” evidence of which may be found in the 
“works of jurists and commentators”). Delegations and apparent delegations of power to 
non-U.S. entities to take legislative, executive, and judicial action that purports to bind 
the U.S. are ubiquitous. They have been criticized by some scholars, see, for example, 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 
YALE L.J. 1762 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural 
Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003), but have not been 
held unconstitutional by U.S. courts.  
 5. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (holding that Congress may by statute 
vest executive power in an officer not appointed either by the President or by a 
subordinate executive officer appointed by the President, and who is not subject to the 
direction, control, and removal of the President); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 
(1974) (a subordinate executive branch officer may exercise the executive power of the 
United States, and courts will enforce such actions as the final actions of the executive 
branch, even where in opposition to the expressed position of the President of the United 
States). But cf. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) (not disputing this general principle but finding unconstitutional a 
two-level good-cause removal restriction on the President’s ability to require 
subordinates to execute laws in accordance with his directives). 
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and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
Service of the United States, provided that neither this power nor 
the “executive Power” of the President shall be construed to 
include the constitutional power to prescribe military policies or 
actions concerning the capture, detention, interrogation, and 
appropriate imposition of military punishment for offenses 
against the law of war, of enemy prisoners captured in the course 
of ongoing hostilities pursuant to a congressional declaration of 
war or authorization for use of military force.”6 
7. Article II, Section 4 is amended to read as follows: “The 
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors. Provided, however, that the commission by the 
President of the felonies of perjury and obstruction of justice, 
committed while in office as President and involving dishonesty 
with respect to the administration of justice, shall not justify 
removal from office, if the criminally dishonest and felonious 
conduct in question involves a cover-up of an exploitative sexual 
relationship with a subordinate employee in the White House and 
if the President retains the political support of his party in 
Congress.”7 
8. Article III, Section 1 is amended to add the following 
sentence at the conclusion of the present language of this section: 
“Provided, however, that Congress may vest the judicial power in 
such administrative agencies as it sees fit, to be exercised by 
persons of such qualifications, appointed in such a manner, and 
 
 6. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that President’s constitu-
tional military power as Commander-in-Chief does not include independent power to 
institute and carry out military policies and punishment with respect to captured enemy 
prisoners of war and unlawful enemy combatants). 
 7. 145 CONG. REC. 2376–78 (1999) (U.S. Senate Rollcall Vote February 12, 1999); 
See Trial of the President; Excerpts of Debate Comments; Senators Spell Out Their 
Convictions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A27 (excerpting statements of Senators voting 
to acquit President Clinton of perjury and obstruction of justice because they did not 
regard such conduct, by Clinton, as a “high crime[] [or] misdemeanor[]”within the 
meaning of the Constitution); The Senate Verdict; Excerpts of Vote Comments; Respect 
for Law, Defense of Presidency Cited as Impetus for Votes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999 at 
A22 (citing statements from Senators voting to acquit President Clinton of the 
impeachment crimes in part because Clinton retained strong political support). On the 
question of the proper understanding of what properly constitute “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” justifying impeachment and removal of federal officers, the Senate is the 
final, authoritative interpreter of the Constitution because the Supreme Court, as final, 
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, has said that in this instance the Senate is 
the final, authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 
224 (1993). 
!!!PAULSEN-273-OURPERFECTCONSTITUTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  2:31 PM 
2011] OUR PERFECT CONSTITUTION 535 
 
possessing such tenure in office, as Congress shall determine, and 
subject to such review as Congress thinks proper by the Judges of 
superior and inferior courts hereinbefore described.”8 
9. Non-citizens of the United States who commit acts of war, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity or other atrocities against the 
United States, its armed forces, or its civilian citizens, thereby 
acquire U.S. constitutional rights, including the Privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus to challenge their military detention by 
U.S. armed forces outside the United States, in time of war.9 
10. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 is amended to read as 
follows: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it. Provided, however, that Congress 
may not suspend the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus with 
respect to enemy alien combatants detained abroad in time of war, 
even if Congress provides for judicial review by other means of 
executive branch military detention.”10 
11. Article VI, Clause 2, is amended to add the following 
language at its conclusion: “Provided, however, that notwith-
standing any other provision in this Constitution or implication 
from its structure of separation of powers, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of this Constitution shall be the Supreme Law of 
the Land, anything in the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States to the contrary notwithstanding. The Supreme 
Court’s interpretations of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of 
the United States shall be binding on all other branches and 
officers of the national and state governments, and on the people 
themselves, who shall be tested by following the Court’s 
commands. The authoritative status of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions and its authority to speak before all others for the 
Constitution, shall not be challenged or questioned in any other 
place, on the ground of being contrary to the meaning of the 
Constitution or for any other reason.”11 
 
 8. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851(1986) 
(holding that Congress may “depart from the requirements of Article III” and assign the 
judicial power to non-Article III tribunals, depending on the “origins and importance of 
the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the 
requirements of Article III”). 
 9. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (equating decisions of the Supreme 
Court with the Constitution as “supreme Law of the Land” and stating that “the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”); accord United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (Supreme Court is “ultimate interpreter of the 
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12. The doctrine of stare decisis being fundamental to the rule 
of law, to public perceptions of the integrity of the Supreme Court, 
and to stability, predictability and reliability, the Supreme Court 
shall always adhere to its prior constitutional decisions,12 except 
when it decides not to do so. 13 
13. The right of the people to kill living human embryos or 
fetuses, as specified more fully below, shall not be infringed for 
any reason or on any pretext. Specifically: 
Section 1. There shall be an absolute right of a pregnant 
woman to kill a living human embryo or fetus gestating in her 
womb. That right may be exercised for any reason the woman 
and abortionist think proper, up until the point when the 
human embryo or fetus could live outside his or her mother’s 
womb, after which time the right to kill may be exercised for 
any medical, psychological, emotional, social, or family reason 
the woman and abortionist think proper.14 
Section 2. Government may prohibit, as a method of killing the 
human fetus, the process of inducing delivery of a born human 
child except for the head, puncturing the head with a sharp 
instrument, vacuuming or suctioning the contents of the skull 
from the child’s head, collapsing the skull, and completing the 
delivery of the deceased fetus; provided, however, that 
government may prohibit this method only if some equally 
effective method of killing the fetus is available to the pregnant 
 
Constitution”) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) and Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) for this proposition); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) (Court is the “ultimate expositor of the constitutional text”). 
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (Court is “invested with the 
authority to decide [the people’s] constitutional cases and speak before all others for 
their constitutional ideals”). 
 12. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992) (setting forth a grand 
general theory of the importance of stare decisis as fundamental to its decision to 
reaffirm Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 
(2000) (relying on stare decisis to reaffirm Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873, 882 (overturning the trimester 
framework of Roe v. Wade and overruling two constitutional decisions applying it); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986) on the ground that it was “not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today” and therefore “ought not to remain binding precedent.”); see also, e.g., Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)). 
 14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163-65 (1973) (setting forth trimester 
framework explicitly permitting abortion for any reason prior to viability and permitting 
abortion for any “health” reason thereafter); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192, 195–201 
(1973) (defining “health” to include family, social, and emotional reasons for wishing to 
have an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–74 (employing a 
viability line but carrying forward the Roe-Doe definition of “health”). 
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woman, like dismemberment of the fetus in the womb.15 
Section 3. Government may regulate abortion procedures and 
require provision of informed-consent information to pregnant 
women considering killing the human embryo or fetus, as long 
as providing such information presents no substantial obstacle 
to exercise of the right to kill the embryo or fetus.16 
14. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is amended to add the following clarification: “State 
governments are categorically forbidden from using race or color 
as a basis of classification for the granting of benefits, the 
imposition of burdens, or separate or discriminatory treatment in 
any other form; provided, however, that state governments may 
engage in such classification to the detriment of persons of white 
or Asian race, color, or ethnicity, in consideration for admission 
to state universities.”17 
15. The provisions of the First Amendment concerning 
freedom of religion are amended or clarified as follows. 
Section 1. Government may not make and enforce laws 
preventing, punishing, or penalizing the exercise of religion; 
provided, however, that it may make and enforce such laws if it 
does not say that that is their purpose and if they are cast in 
facially neutral terms.18 
Section 2. Government may destroy Native American 
traditional religious holy sites in America, without thereby 
burdening the free exercise of site-specific Native American 
religious observance, because we stole their land fair and square.19 
Section 3. Government may not discriminate against religious 
persons or groups on the basis of their religious identity, 
profession, exercise, or expression, except that it may do so in 
certain government scholarship programs.20 
 
 15. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (prohibition of “partial-birth 
abortion” valid because “requiring doctors to intend dismemberment before delivery” 
will not prohibit “the vast majority of D&E abortions.”); id. at 164, 165 (ban on “partial-
birth” method does not require a “health” exception because “it appears likely that an 
injection that kills the fetus is an alternative” not prohibited by the act. “Here the Act 
allows, among other means, a commonly used and generally accepted method, so it does 
not construct a substantial obstacle to the abortion right.”).  
 16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–87.  
 17. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 18. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 19. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) 
(“Whatever rights the Indians might have to use of the area, however, those rights do not 
divest the Government of the right to use what is, after all, its land.”). 
 20. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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Section 4. The freedom of speech extends to religious persons 
and groups. Accordingly, government may not impose a financial 
penalty on expression because of its religious nature, content, or 
viewpoint, except that it may do so in government scholarship 
programs.21 
Section 5. The freedom of association for expressive purposes 
exists for all private groups and extends to religious persons and 
groups. Government may not abridge the freedom of persons to 
engage in group expression, worship and association; nor may it 
abridge the freedom of persons to form groups for expressive 
purposes of any kind, free of government interference with their 
membership decisions and ability to define their group’s goals, 
purposes and identity; provided, however, that the government 
may regulate private, commercial, nonexpressive associations for 
reasons thought to be compelling;22 and provided further that the 
freedom of expressive association shall not apply to student 
groups at state universities, if state officials so decide, at least in 
the case of student religious groups.23 
Section 6. Government violates religious freedom when it 
enacts a law to accommodate the circumstances of public school 
children with disabilities or special education needs who belong to 
a minority religious group.24 
Section 7. This Constitution shall be construed to forbid the 
display on government property of Christmas nativity scene 
displays depicting the birth of Jesus, unless the display includes 
elves and a talking wishing well, but to permit the display on 
government property of a Hanukkah menorah if it is close to a 
pagan Christmas tree.25 This Constitution further shall be 
construed to forbid the display on government property of the Ten 
Commandments and to permit the display on government 
property of the Ten Commandments, depending.26 
16. The right to freedom of speech and expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment shall include the right to burn 
 
 21. Id. at 720 n.3. 
 22. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 23. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); contra Healy v. James, 
408 U.S. 169 (1972).  
 24. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
 25. Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 26. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (invalidating a Ten 
Commandments display included as part of a display of historic legal documents in a 
Kentucky courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding freestanding 
Ten Commandments monument erected on the grounds of the Texas state capitol 
building). 
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the United States flag as an act of protest, the right to distribute 
pornography, the right to be free from regulation of the time, 
place, and manner of portrayals of explicit sexual material on 
cable television channels or on the internet, and the right to 
portray sexual sadism involving the killing of animals,27 but shall 
not include the right to distribute literature or engage in 
counseling or advocacy on public sidewalks within eight feet of 
another person, near abortion clinics.28 No injunctions shall issue 
to restrict the publication of classified national security 
information in time of war,29 nor shall any injunction issue against 
the speech or expressive activities of any person or group, on 
account of the content, viewpoint, or identity of such advocacy or 
on account of affiliation with any group or because of tortious or 
otherwise disruptive activities of members of a group with which 
the speaker is associated in common advocacy activities,30 unless 
the group of speakers is engaged in advocacy in opposition to the 
killing of human fetuses.31 Nor shall the offensiveness of public 
expression by individuals or groups ever be an appropriate basis 
for prohibiting, restricting, punishing, or penalizing such 
expression,32 unless the expression criticizes the killing of human 
fetuses and such expression would upset or displease persons 
engaged in such killing, in which case the opposite rule shall 
apply.33 
17. The right of the people to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures includes the right of persons who have 
committed crimes to exclude from admission into evidence against 
them any information resulting from such a search or seizure, but 
persons who have not committed such crimes shall have no 
 
 27. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15 (1973) (First Amendment protects patently offensive sexually explicit material 
that possesses any “serious literary, artistic, or scientific merit”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (First Amendment protects child pornography created 
with virtual images of children rather than with the use of actual children); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (First Amendment protects internet pornography); Stevens 
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (First Amendment protects “crush videos” 
depicting a living animal being intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or 
killed). 
 28. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).  
 29. New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 
713 (1971). 
 30. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 31. Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 32. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 33. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 
Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); see also Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. 
v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).  
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effectual remedy for violation of their rights to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures because it all works out best 
for everybody this way.34 
18. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, and the police shall be obliged to make 
certain that no person voluntarily makes any statement or 
provides any information that would assist the police in any way 
to prove that such person has committed a crime.35 
19. If government executes a person for the crime of raping a 
child, the government is being cruel and must refrain from such 
cruel conduct. If government executes a teenager for the crime of 
gang-raping and then murdering an old woman by duct-taping 
her mouth, tying her up, raping her and throwing her off a bridge 
to drown, the government is being cruel and must refrain from 
such cruel conduct, because that is what some nations in Europe 
probably think.36 
20. The right of two (or more) men to engage in anal sex with 
one another is a transcendent dimension of liberty, and shall not 
be infringed.37 
 
There! Perfect. 
 
 
 
 34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 
(1977). 
 36. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (“national consensus” exists 
against imposing the death penalty for raping children); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (minors may not be executed for kidnap, torture, and murder) (considering 
evidence of what other nations do).  
 37. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003) (“The instant case involves 
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions. . . . The 
question before the Court is the validity of a Texas statute making it a crime for two 
persons of the same sex to engage in . . . ‘deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex.’”); 
id. at 578–79 (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. . . . As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.”). 
